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When Bert Foer asked me to articulate principles for post-
Chicago antitrust analysis, he was unaware that he had engaged a
"ringer." My first two decades were spent as a resident of what Colonel
McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, used to call
"Chicagoland," and I was thoroughly indoctrinated in the values of the
place. One of those values was "agin-ism"-that is, whatever the
conventional wisdom was, we Chicagolanders tended to be ag'in' it, or
for the great unwashed, against it.
Knowing this and knowing also that the University of Chicago was
founded thanks to the largesse of John D. Rockefeller, who at the time
was not exactly Americans' favorite business leader, goes a long way
toward explaining Chicago's contributions to the debate over monopoly,
competition, and antitrust.
I. CHICAGO ECONOMISTS' CONTRIBUTIONS
Among the three great Chicago economists who wrote on those
themes in the early decades of the 20th century, two, Thorstein Veblen
and Henry Simons, were clearly ag'in'ers. Only Frank Knight tended to
produce dry theoretical pieces that drew few direct implications for
policy.
Thorstein Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class1 rejected the then-
ascendant theories emphasizing economic equilibrium based upon
consumers' maximization of their own utility, oblivious to the
consumption of others. Veblen stressed instead that "conspicuous
consumption" was all about keeping up with and preferably surpassing
t Aetna Professor Emeritus at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University; Lecturer, Princeton University.
I THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEIsURE CLAss (The Macmillan Company ed.,
1899).
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the Joneses. His Theory of Business Enterprise2 ridiculed the emphasis
of business leaders on financial shenanigans that undermined the
productivity and stability of capitalism. Veblen could have been patron
saint of the FfC's efforts in the breakfast cereal shared monopoly case
and "Kid Vid" during the late 1970s, but his works were too radical to
be cited safely. My own experience in that era taught me two lessons:
(1) Never sue firms whose rivalry is based mainly on big consumer
advertising expenditures, because you will draw unremittingly bad
press; and (2) Never threaten the funeral directors, each of whom sees a
congressman nearly every week.
Henry Simons' most remembered work, A Positive Program for
Laissez Faire,3 appeared in 1934, when the world economy struggled in
the depths of depression and a newly-inaugurated Franklin D. Roosevelt
thought that through NRA-backed cartelization combined with
unionization, he could reflate the economy into prosperity. Simons
opposed cartels and monopolies as vehemently as he opposed
governmental regulation, in part because he believed the accepted
political solution to monopoly would be regulation. To ensure that the
economy remained self-regulating, he proposed a program of structural
fragmentation so that "in major industries no ownership unit should
produce or control more than 5 percent of total output.' '4 Needless to
say, a monopolization policy as tough as the one Simons proposed has
never been accepted.
Among the next generation of Chicago writers on matters relevant
to antitrust, the most prominent are George Stigler, Ronald Coase, and
the little-published but enormously influential Aaron Director. Stigler
began his career as a hard-liner on antitrust policy but apparently had a
vision somewhere on the road to Hyde Park. I will not attempt to trace
how his views changed, but will simply assert that interaction with his
colleague Aaron Director had something to do with the changes.
Director was an ag'in'er in the best midwestern sense of the word. He
and the associates he inspired systematically subjected the corpus of
antitrust economics, as it had come to be accepted by the 1950s, to
critical scrutiny and highlighted numerous logical and factual
shortcomings.5 This is the way science progresses, and we should
acknowledge a heavy debt to the critical analysis Director and associates
contributed.
2 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (C. Scribner's Sons ed., 1904).
3 HENRY C. SIMONS, PUBLIC POLICY PAMPHLET No. 15, A POsrrIvE PROGRAM FOR
LAISSEZ FAIRE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR A LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICY (Harry D. Gideonse ed.,
1934).
4 Id. at 319.
5 On the role of Director (and also Ronald Coase), see The Fire of Truth: A Remem-
brance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983).
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Coase, Director, and Stigler interacted in another important way.
The essence of Coase's approach to economic problems is revealed in a
few sentences from his Nobel Prize-winning paper on social costs:
All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose
that government regulation is called for simply because the
problem is not well handled by the market or the firm. Satis-
factory views on policy can only come from a patient study
of how, in practice, the market, firms and governments han-
dle the problem of harmful effects.6
The key here is making a "patient study." One of the great
Chicago traditions for students seeking the Ph.D. in industrial
organization was to carry out careful, price theory-based empirical
studies of specific real-world industries and institutions. This too is the
way science progresses. The case study methodology was by no means
unique to Chicago; it was pursued during the Edward Mason, Carl
Kaysen, and Richard Caves eras at Harvard. And perhaps therein lay its
greatest problem, for, as George Stigler observed in an early paper:
To determine whether any industry is workably competitive,
therefore, simply have a good graduate student write his dis-
sertation on the industry and render a verdict. It is crucial to
this test, of course, that no second graduate student be al-
lowed to study the industry.
7
What is unfortunate, as Stigler was saying with characteristic
sarcasm, is that we conduct far too few careful empirical studies.
Therefore, we end up making judgments about the state of the world on
the basis of empirical studies into which methodological or ideological
biases have intruded without a proper corrective in the marketplace of
ideas. That is the best case. The situation has worsened as young
scholars find their careers advanced most rapidly by doing theory for its
own sake, with an occasional anecdote thrown in to convey the flavor if
not the actuality of concern for realism, instead of undertaking the
painstaking labor required to study an industry's functioning
empirically. Then we make our judgments on the basis of empirically
unsupported theory or, worse yet, poorly supported ideology.
6 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960).
7 George J. Stigler et al., Report on Antitrust Policy - Discussion, 46 AM. ECON. REV.
496,505 (1956).
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II. Two IMPORTANT "CHICAGO" POSTULATES
Work in every school of thought is subject to biases. At Chicago,
two particularly important prior beliefs have tended to pervade both its
theoretical and empirical work in this audience's field of interest:
(1) Chiseling erodes cartels, and entry erodes monopoly,
quickly unless the government intervenes to create barriers to
entry and the expansion of fringe firms.
(2) What exists in the marketplace exists because it is
efficient unless it has been put there by government fiat.
The roots of these beliefs can be found in the writings of Henry Simons
and Frank Knight, with important contributions thereafter from Stigler,
Director, and Coase. The key question is, are the beliefs valid? Only a
careful examination of real-world evidence can provide a satisfactory
answer.
In this short Article I can by no means undertake the kind of
comprehensive analysis required to accept or refute those beliefs. I
compromise by making a few observations on two facets and then turn
to a third-the question of how mergers affect economic efficiency-for
a more careful investigation.
1I. THE EROSION OF CARTELS
First, on the erosion of cartels, in recent years the Department of
Justice has achieved extraordinary success in uncovering and penalizing
cartels, many of them international. From the results of that effort, it is
self-evident that cartels continue to exist, and that they have not been
eroded away into oblivion by chiseling tendencies. I would hope, no
doubt much too optimistically, that scholars will be given access to the
underlying case materials so they can conduct careful studies of why
those cartels were formed and how they managed to overcome the
problems of chiseling.8
From personal experience as a consultant in connection with two
alleged international cartels, one subjected to antitrust fines and one not,
I can offer at least partial support for the Chicago view. In both cases,
the behavior that gave rise to allegations of price-fixing was strongly
influenced by a governmental intervention: the anti-dumping laws. In
8 Remarkably, little insight is provided on these questions in KURT EICHENWALD, THE
INFORMANT (2000) (commenting on the lysine and citric acid cases).
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the potash case, sudden increases in the price of potash from
Saskatchewan were triggered by anti-dumping complaints from
inefficient U.S. potash producers, preliminary determinations that
substantial anti-dumping tariffs would be levied, and a negotiated
settlement under which in effect the companies agreed to raise their
prices to non-dumping levels.9 In the vitamin case my client, who must
remain anonymous, was lured into being a reluctant and at best
imperfectly compliant member of the cartel by threats that if it did not
participate, it would be driven out of the U.S. and European markets by
anti-dumping complaints-a threat that was credible, given my client's
status as a newcomer to the industry still moving down its learning-by-
doing cost curve. Something needs to be done to fix this conflict
between our competition laws and our trade laws.
In view of the massive fines imposed by U.S. and foreign antitrust
authorities when price-fixing schemes have been detected, I believe it is
inevitable that in the future such activities will be driven deep
underground. The study of history forces us to expect no less. After it
was recognized in the 1890s that the Sherman Act was going to be an
effective restraint against overt price-fixing and market-sharing
agreements, U.S. companies reacted by carrying out a massive merger
wave that in some industries created dominant firms with substantial
autonomous price-setting power. When looser market structures
resulted, there were vigorous efforts to elicit cooperative oligopolistic
pricing through the cultivation of price leadership and "open price"
practices. 10 When Section I of the Sherman Act was found through the
electrical equipment cases of the 1950s to have sufficient teeth to put
violating business executives into prison, General Electric responded
with new price leadership and "most favored customer" schemes that
successfully encouraged cooperation among the turbogenerator
oligopolists." It follows that carving notches into one's baton for
successful price-fixing prosecutions is going to be harder for antitrust
agency heads in the future. The agencies are going to have to undertake
the much more difficult task of combating oligopolistic facilitating
practices-a task to which they have been unequal in the past.
9 For a more detailed analysis of this and other international cartel cases, see Frederic M.
Scherer, International Trade and Competition Policy, in COMPETION AND TRADE POLICIES:
COHERENCE OR CONFLiCT? 20-23 (Einar Hope & Per Maeleng eds., 1998).
10 See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUsTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 153-56, 160, 248-61,347-59 (3d. ed. 1990) (discussing price leadership in steel,
automobile, cigarette and gasoline industries and open pricing strategies through trade associa-
tions).
" See id. at 212,258-259.
2001]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
IV. SHORT-LIVED MONOPOLIES?
It is undoubtedly true that some monopoly positions erode quickly.
But there are many counter-examples. It took seventy-five years for the
pricing power of the United States Steel Corporation, exercised first
from a position of dominance and then through price leadership, to
erode sufficiently that independent pricing could be seen in the steel
industry. 12  It took roughly fifty-five years for Japanese entry to
undermine the price and product leadership of General Motors. 3 Intel
and Microsoft enjoyed near-monopoly positions for two decades in
personal computer microprocessors and operating systems respectively.
There is no indication that a serious challenge to Microsoft's position
has materialized. In micro-processors, Intel's position was first
challenged seriously when Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD") leaped
ahead technologically with its Athlon processor in the year 2000.
Whether AMD will be able to sustain its competitive challenge remains
to be seen.
V. MERGERS AND EFFICIENCY
In what follows, I want to dwell in much more detail on a theme
where the gap between Chicago and other parts of the world is widest:
the question of the extent to which mergers lead to efficiency gains.
14
The "Chicago" with which I deal here is not the Chicago of Stigler,
Coase, Director, and their mainstream economist successors. Rather,
the view that mergers are on average efficiency-enhancing stems from
the corporate finance specialists at Chicago, their University of
Rochester farm club compatriots, and a considerable number of younger
finance specialists who have been brought up in the tradition they
created.
No one will be surprised to read that the United States and
indeed the wider world around us are experiencing the largest
merger wave in history. The average annual value of merger and
acquisition transactions tracked by a leading U.S. statistical source
(alas, the Federal Trade Commission has abandoned the role it
once occupied in providing such information) over four recent
five-year periods is as follows:
12 See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 150-99
(1996).
13 See id. at299-319.
14 Substantial parts of the analysis that follows are drawn from F. M. Scherer, The Merger
Puzzle, Prepared Remarks Before the Ottobeuren Seminar on Economic Science in Germany
(Sept. 2001) (on file with author).
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In 1999, a record-breaking 9,278 recorded transactions brought the
value of such transactions to a record-breaking level of $1.43 trillion.
VI. THE RANCAL EcoNOMIcs VIEw
Adherents to the "finance school" of merger analysis (I will call
them that rather than a "Chicago school" because they are now
diversified geographically) advance a rather simple argument to show
that mergers enhance efficiency. The argument is based upon what has
become an axiom of corporate finance theory: that securities markets are
"efficient" in the sense that at any moment in time, they impound and
hence are driven to daily equilibrium by all the information on
individual corporation performance, past, present, and expected future,
that is legally available. From this axiom follows the conclusion that the
best insight into the merger's likely effects can be derived by observing
how common stock prices respond to the first announcement of an
impending merger. One analyzes how stock prices change during a
short time "window"-e.g., five trading days before and after-around
the announcement date. What most such studies have shown is that the
price of the target firm's stock rises sharply, e.g., from fifteen to forty
percent, reflecting whatever premium the acquiring firm is offering over
the pre-announcement value of the target company's stock price. For
the acquiring company, the most typical (but less uniform) experience is
that the company's share price neither falls nor rises by an amount that
lies outside the range of statistical error. Thus, a plus is added to a zero,
yielding an over-all plus. Dismissing the possibility that stock price
increases are attributable to increased monopoly power-a question
addressed in other studies using a similar methodology that I shall not
attempt to review here-one concludes that the merger adds to
economic value, as measured by the stock market, and hence must be
efficient. Q.E.D.
Nevertheless, study after study has shown that, although the
acquiring company's common stock prices experience on average zero
cumulative abnormal change in short time "windows" around merger
15 See W.T. GRIMM & CO., MERGERSTAT REVIEW Table 1-4 (2000). See also Andrew
Smith, Fasten Your Seatbelts, FORBES, Apr. 19, 1999, at 260, 260 ("Last year [1998] merger
and acquisition activity in the United States came to $1.6 trillion, which happens to be 20% of
the gross domestic product").
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announcements, they tend, relative to market movements generally, to
decline by impressive and statistically significant magnitudes in the one
to three years that follow substantial merger activity. 16  Thus, the
stockholders of target companies gain unambiguously from having their
companies acquired, but the stockholders of acquiring companies lose.
Whether over-all market value is reduced or enhanced by the merger
depends upon the relative size weights applied to the "plus" for targets
as against the "minus" for acquirers. Since acquirers are usually much
larger than targets, it is easy enough for the sum to be negative. Some
studies that have applied the appropriate weights have indeed found a
negative sum.
Those who defend mergers as value enhancing tend to dismiss
these results as an anomaly, non-causal, or (in a startling non sequitur)
as inconsistent with the axioms of market efficiency combined with the
assurance that mergers are value enhancing. The defenders tend
therefore to ignore them. I do not believe they can be ignored. But let
me advance into a different evidentiary realm that leads to quite
different conclusions.
VII. OTHER EVIDENCE
For one, numerous attempts have been made by management
consulting firms and similarly inclined investigators to determine,
without invoking efficient market axioms, how the mergers of recent
years have turned out. Let me quote some representative examples,
sometimes paraphrased, from popular business journals rather than from
the original sources:
A survey of more than 300 big mergers over the past ten
years by Mercer Management Consulting, a consultancy
based in New York, found that, in the three years following
the transactions, 57% of the merged firms lagged behind
their industries in terms of total returns to shareholders. The
long-run failure rate appears to be even higher. 17
In a study of 100 large deals completed between 1994 and
1997, Mr. Sirower [a professor at the Stem School of Busi-
ness, New York University] found that two-thirds resulted in
16 This point is thoroughly documented in DENNIS C. MUELLER, THE FINANCE LITERA-
TURE ON MERGERS: A CRITICAL SURVEY (Universitzt Wien, Working Paper, 2001).
'7 Why Too Many Mergers Miss the Mark, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1997, at 57.
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immediate and outright losses to shareholders and wound up
underperforming their industry peers over the long haul.
18
[A]s Andrew Campbell of Britain's Ashridge Strategic Man-
agement Centre puts it, "it's like betting on the reds at rou-
lette: the odds of winning are a bit worse than 50%." Some
find it is more like what American roulette players call "dou-
ble street:" only 20% of bets win.19
So what's to show for the dealmania? Sure, some deals pay
off-but far too often, they don't .... Indeed, just one in
five deals lives up to its promise, according to research by
consultants at KPMG [a prominent accounting and consult-
ing firm].20
Repeated studies have shown that, in most mergers, the
shareholders of the acquiring company suffer, and that their
loss is often greater than the gain for the shareholders of the
acquired company. Indeed, many empire-building managers
now indulge in takeovers in spite of, rather than because of,
pressure from shareholders.2
Other evidence can be adduced to show that mergers have less than
a sterling record. In a study of mergers made during the preponderantly
"conglomerate" merger wave of the 1960s and 1970s, David
Ravenscraft and I tapped extraordinarily rich Federal Trade
Commission Line of Business data and found that approximately thirty-
three percent of all U.S. acquisitions made during that period were
subsequently divested.22 Other scholars have published estimates as
high as fifty to sixty percent.
23
Ravenscraft and I found also that the profitability of acquired units
tended systematically to decline after acquisition, the more so, the more
unrelated were the businesses of the acquired firm and its acquirer.2
4
This was true both for voluntary mergers and tender offer takeovers.
Sell-off was preceded on average by a disastrous fall in the profitability
of an acquired unit into the range of negative profits, i.e., losses. Case
'a Gretchen Morgenson, A Cautionary Note on Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at Cl,
C12.
19 Faites vosjeux, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 63.
20 Let's Talk Turkeys, BusINEss WEEK, Dec. 11, 2000, at 44-45 (listing ten of the worst
mergers from recent experience).
21 Governing the Modern Corporation, ECONOMIST, May 5,2001, at 30.
22See DAViD J. RAVENsCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY 166 (1987).
2 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy,
HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1987, at 43. Porter's sample, showing sell-off rates of 53 to 62
percent, was narrower than ours.
24 RAVENSCRAFT & SCHERER, supra note 22, at 193-94.
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studies revealed that the acquiring organizations were unable to provide
effective motivation and control of the acquired unit's activities when
adversities were encountered-as they almost always are, sooner or
later, in business.25
Conducting studies of how profitability changes after as compared
to before a merger poses significant methodological difficulties. When
a merger occurs, the asset values in the surviving company's books are
usually revised as a direct consequence of the merger. Most commonly,
under what we call "purchase accounting" in the United States, the
acquired company's assets are "written up" to reflect any premium paid
by the acquirer over the pre-merger accounting value of those assets.
26
This can occur because of the premium over pre-merger stock prices
needed to persuade shareholders to surrender their shares, or because the
aggregate financial market value of the acquired company is greater
than the accounting value (especially likely in times of high Tobin's "q"
values), or both. The increases in physical asset values or "good will"
written into the surviving enterprise's books may (or may not) be
depreciated annually in the post-merger period. When a premium over
book value is paid, the perceived post-merger profitability of the
company is reduced in two ways: asset or stockholders' equity values
are increased by the writeups, reducing calculated returns on any
measure of invested capital; and profits themselves may be reduced due
to the depreciation of written-up asset values. I know of only two pre-
1990 studies that have tried to compensate for these adjustments so that
comparably measured pre- and post-merger values are analyzed-mine
with David Ravenscraft, and one by Geoffrey Meeks. 7 Both found that
appropriately adjusted profits of the merged enterprises tended on
average to decline, not increase, relative to pre-merger values, although
Ravenscraft and I identified some exceptions to this conclusion. Among
others, mergers of equals-i.e., firms differing in size by no more than a
factor of two--experienced modest profit gains on average after their
merger.28 Reviewing our regression analysis results after fourteen years
of neglect, I find one of the most striking features to be the huge amount
of profit variation not systematically associated with merger effects-a
point to which I turn in a moment.
In a new survey article, three Harvard Business School faculty
members report two more recent studies suggesting positive financial
25 Id. at 135-39, 152-56.
26 New accounting rules effective July 1, 2001, will require all mergers to be treated using
the purchase method.
27 GEOFFREY MEEKS, DISAPPOINTING MARRIAGE: A STUDY OF THE GAINS FROM
MERGER (1977); RAVENSCRAFT & SCHERER, supra note 22, at 75-122.
28 RAVENSCRAFT & SCHERER, supra note 22, at 194.
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performance changes following mergers.29  Both studies emphasize
mergers made in the post-conglomerate era, for which the plausibility of
financial performance gains through merger is greater than for
conglomerate mergers. In the earlier of the two contributions, 30 there
are serious methodological problems. The authors take as their index of
post-merger performance cash flow, which was also used by
Ravenscraft and myself. However, they deflate it by a market-based
asset variable which, if acquiring company stock values fall relative to
the general market in the years following merger, can imply cash flow /
asset performance indicator gains relative to the market even when cash
flows are deteriorating relative to those of peer companies (as the Healy
et al. article shows to have happened).3 ' Their controls for peer industry
performance are extremely crude, e.g., "household products" for a
jewelry producer, "recreation" for a motion picture producer, and
"building" for a firm manufacturing beds and other furniture.32 Their
sample was the fifty largest U.S. mergers consummated between 1979
and 1984.33 Target firm assets were on average forty-two percent of
acquirer assets, which makes their sample approximate the "mergers of
equals" subset found by Ravenscraft and me to have the most favorable
post-merger performance.
In their survey article, Andrade et al. discuss briefly their own
statistical analysis of some 2,000 U.S. mergers made between 1973 and
19 98 .
34 Their performance measure is cash flow divided by sales,
which is the same as a measure used by Ravenscraft and me and which
is much more defensible than the index used by Healy et al. The
derivation of their industry controls is not described in sufficient detail
to know whether the problems in the Healy et al. approach are avoided.
The gain in average post- vs. pre-merger cash flow performance indices
amounted to between 0.23 and 0.35 percentage points relative to an
unreported base,35 which was ten percent in the comparable analysis by
Ravenscraft and me. The reported statistical significance test is only
against the null hypothesis of no differences between the merger sample
and the peer industry control group, not of pre- vs. post-merger changes.
From a regression analysis, the authors report a mean post-merger
29 Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 2001, at 103, 112 (concluding that mergers generate value on behalf of the shareholders
of the combined firms).
-o Paul M. Healy et al., Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers? 31 J. FIN.
ECON. 135, 135 (1992) (concluding that merged firms show "significant improvements in asset
productivity relative to their industries").
31 Id. at 139.
32 Id. at 165-74.
33 Id. at 135.
34 Andrade et al., supra note 29, at 115-16.31 Id. at 116.
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performance gain of 1.07 percentage points,36 but fail to note that a
second coefficient from the same regression implies significant mean
reversion. It is possible that a more detailed report on the authors'
research will resolve these apparent shortcomings, but for the moment, a
verdict of "not proven" must be handed down.
VIII. THE DISTRIBuTION OF MERGER OUTCOMES
A different but useful perspective is provided from research nearly
seven decades ago by Shaw Livermore.37 Livermore painstakingly
tracked the large number of companies resulting from the first great
United States merger wave, which occurred between 1888 and 1905.
Among his "primary" group, covering enterprises formed in efforts to
dominate some industry, he counted in total 156 resultant companies.
Of these, 40.4 percent were found to be "failures," most of which were
drawn into bankruptcy or were otherwise dissolved or broken up.38
Another 10.9 percent were classified as "limping;" that is, they
continued to exist, but did not amount to much as of 1923. 39 (Several of
the "limping" group still exist.) The remaining 48.7 percent were
viewed as successes--6.4 percent of the total being outstanding
successes. The outstanding successes as of 1923 were as follows:
American Can (d. 1986)
American Tobacco (d. 1988)




National Biscuit (Nabisco) (d. 1985)
Otis Elevator (d. 1974)
Quaker Oats (d. 2001)
United Fruit (now Chiquita Brands)4°
Five of the ten survived as independent enterprises in 2001; the most
successful of the five was General Electric. The dates at which the
others lost their independence, in all cases through mergers, are shown
in parentheses, preceded by a "d."
36 id.
37 Shaw Livermore, The Success of Industrial Mergers, 50 Q.J. ECoN. 68 (1935).
38 Id. at 75.
39 Id.
4o Id. at 93-94.
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In a paper written during the 1980s, I referred to the Livermore
study and emphasized the high fraction of failures among consolidations
that were pursued with the avowed intention of dominating their
industries. Mr. Livermore wrote me a note thanking me for resurrecting
his work, but commenting that I had missed his main point: that so
many of the mergers were successes. For the years 1919 through 1932,
forty-nine "successful" mergers earned an average return on their capital
value of 9.07 percent, compared to 8.43 percent for a wider benchmark
sample of U.S. manufacturing corporations. (The difference was not
statistically significant at customary confidence levels, with t = 0.49.)
The companies emerging from successful mergers did not perform
spectacularly well on average, but they did by and large achieve a
substantial modicum of industrial and financial success. And that, said
Livermore, was the important point I had neglected.
For conglomerate mergers of the 1960s and 1970s, Ravenscraft and
I carried out a related analysis. 41 We focused on thirteen companies that
had made at least ninety-nine acquisitions between 1950 and 1978, most
of which were of a conglomerate character, and among which at least 20
were in the manufacturing sector.42 These were success cases, at least in
the sense that the stock market and company boards of directors
permitted managers to persist in their merger-intensive strategies. We
performed a hypothetical experiment, investing in each of the thirteen
companies $1,000 as of June 1965, before the conglomerate merger
boom entered its phase of rapid growth. We then calculated, reinvesting
any dividends as they were paid out, how much the stock market value
of our investments would be as of June 1983, by which time
conglomerate merger-making had fallen into disfavor. We also
determined the value of the same $1,000 investment in the Standard &
Poors index of 500 widely-traded stocks. Our $1,000 investment in the
S&P portfolio would have been worth $4,106 in 1983. The results are
summarized in Figure 1 on the following page.
Six of the thirteen "successful" conglomerates yielded 1983 values
lower than this benchmark. But seven did better, and three -Teledyne,
Whittaker, and Gulf & Western-did spectacularly better.43 Largely on
the strength of these few outstanding successes, the average value of our
$1,000 investments in 13 conglomerates would have been $11,114 in
1983, or 2.7 times the value of similar investments in the S&P portfolio.
Or if the extreme value for Teledyne is excluded, the average 1983
value from investing in conglomerates would have been $6,585, or 1.6
times the S&P benchmark.
41 RAVENSCRAFr & SCHERER, supra note 22, at 38-45.
42 id. at 38.
43 Id. at 43.
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20000 S&P 500 Value
0)
Teledyne U.S. Industries Chromalloy ITT Corp. Genesco
Whittaker Textron Beatrice Litton
Gulf & Western Walter Kidde Consol. Foods W.R. Grace
Company
What the combination of this evidence seems to reveal is that
making mergers is a risky proposition. Many mergers, and perhaps the
majority, fail to live up to expectations and may indeed make matters
worse rather than better. Many muddle through. A fair number
succeed, and a few succeed spectacularly. It is difficult to be certain
where the average lies. It is a well-known property of highly skewed
outcome distributions that the average outcome depends critically on
how many spectacular successes one achieves and how extreme those
successes are. With good luck, merger-making over-all is a positive-
sum game, with bad luck, perhaps not.
This conclusion has probable implications for a theory of
managerial merger motives. Making mergers is a form of gambling;
skill matters, but there is an important chance component. Nevertheless,
it is a quite different kind of gambling than what goes on at Las Vegas
and Atlantic City. In those locales, one knows at the end of the evening
how one has fared, and the house will insist that the losers pay their
debts promptly-or see to it that their kneecaps are broken. But the
returns from merger-making take many years to materialize. In the
interim, managers are well paid for what they are doing, and they
probably enjoy doing it. If they succeed after a sufficient number of
years have elapsed to tally the score, they will be even more
handsomely rewarded for the minority of big successes, whereas the
failures will be penalized at worst by dismissal with generous severance
pay. To this scholar who has never met a payroll, it seems an extremely
attractive form of gambling.
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IX. MERGER POLICY IMPLICATIONS
For public policy, the standard question is whether a merger creates
undesirable monopoly power. This is an appropriate goal, however
difficult it may be to implement. But efficiency questions cannot be
avoided. Mergers that reduce efficiency are bad for the economy. For
mergers that increase efficiency but also increase monopoly power, a
well-known tradeoff must be faced.44 One ought to be willing to accept
some price-raising and allocative inefficiency due to monopolistic
pricing if substantial resource savings will be achieved in the bargain. I
do not believe that governmental agencies have, or could under any
circumstances have, sufficient competence and information to screen all
mergers and approve only those that have good prospects of enhancing
efficiency, or at least not undermining efficiency. But when
governmental bodies are entrusted with vetting potentially
anticompetitive mergers and preventing the undesirable ones, I do not
know how they can fail responsibly to consider the possibility that
substantial efficiencies could result from a merger they are evaluating.
After a long debate and various intermediate reversals, this is the
approach the United States government eventually embraced when the
two antitrust agencies published their revised Merger Guidelines in
1984.45
One of the first merger cases litigated under the 1984 Guidelines
concerned the acquisition of Clinton Corn Processing Division of
Nabisco Brands ("Clinton") by Archer-Daniels-Midland Company
("ADM"). As one who had advocated accepting efficiency defenses at
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") while I was chief economist
during the mid-1970s, I responded enthusiastically when Owen
Johnson, my former FTC colleague, approached me and asked me to
mount a formal efficiencies defense in the ADM-Clinton case. The case
was unusual in the sense that the merger had already been consummated
when it was challenged, and because of technical disputes and
procedural skirmishing, the lag from merger to ADM's day in court was
eight years. Among other things, the Department of Justice filed a
motion in lmine attempting to restrict severely the scope of our
defense.46 We won the battle; Judge Vietor rejected the motion and
allowed us to present a full-fledged defense. We also won the
44 See Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58
AM. ECON. REv. 18, 18-19 (1968) (arguing that a rational treatment of the merger question
requires an effort "to establish the allocative implications of the scale economy and market
power effects associated with the merger").
45 DEP'T OFJUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984).
46 For my reply to the motion, see my Affidavit on Efficiency Defenses in United States v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Iowa 1999), reprinted in F.M. SCHERER,
COMPErrION PoLIcy, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 259-69 (2000).
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immediate war; the merger was allowed to go through.47 But for me the
victory was intellectually disappointing, since Judge Vietor decided the
case on other grounds and therefore found it unnecessary to create new
precedents by considering in detail the efficiencies defense.
Six years later, the substantive thrust of the Department's 1987
motion in limine resurfaced as Holy Writ in the 1997 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.48 Three main facets of those revised guidelines warrant
discussion.
One states that the "only efficiencies considered are those likely to
be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be
accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another
means having comparable anticompetitive effects. ''49 This, I believe, is
a correct approach. In the ADM case, we presented evidence showing
that ADM had lower costs than other corn wet millers and that its
unique approach to plant operation made it likely to wring the largest
possible efficiencies out of Clinton's operations.
In my later work for the government on the proposed merger
between Lockheed/Martin and Northrop/Grumman, I applied the test
and found that most of the product and research laboratory
reassignments proposed as a means of reducing costs involved work
transfers within one of the would-be merger partners, not between the
partners. Given this, it was far from clear why the changes could not
have been made without merger. It is possible that the approach taken
by the two aerospace companies was an anomaly resulting from the
special procurement regulations applying to defense industry mergers. 50
Under the applicable rules, the government will reimburse severance
and other reorganization costs if they are incurred within the context of a
merger. Thus, defense companies have perverse incentives to delay
perceived cost-saving measures until they can be effected within the
framework of a merger and hence receive compensation that would
never be attainable outside the defense sphere (except in the sense that
the Internal Revenue Service is a 34 percent partner in any profit-
reducing activity). I nevertheless wonder whether such behavior may be
more widespread. For most managers, cost-cutting is an unpleasant
task, especially when it entails throwing workers into the ranks of the
unemployed. It may be preferable to wait for a merger and justify the
47 See United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1423 (S.D. Iowa
1991) (granting judgment for defendants, Archer-Daniels-Midland, and dismissing U.S. Clayton
Act § 7 claim, as defendants presented adequate evidence of post-acquisition efficiencies).
48 DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, 1992 HoIizoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES].
49 Id. § 4.
50 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 103-337, 108 Stat. 2821 (1994) (codified
as a note to 10 U.S.C. § 2324).
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layoffs as one of the inevitable consequences of post-merger
restructuring. To the extent that this is true, scrupulously critical
application of the "no defense for efficiencies that could be achieved
anyway" criterion is warranted.
Second, the 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that
cognizable efficiencies must be "sufficient to reverse the merger's
potential to harm consumers in any relevant market .... ,51 In other
words, the cost savings must be sufficient, in the framework of a model
of how the merged company will set its prices after merger, to reverse
any tendency toward price increases. This approach in effect says that
the agencies reject the notion of a "tradeoff," whose compelling
rationale was articulated in a pioneering article by Oliver Williamson.
5 2
I believe refusal to consider possible tradeoffs, however difficult they
may be to make, sacrifices the benefits consumers derive from the
efficient use of resources. In this I confess to being an unredeemed
Chicagoan.
Third, the Guidelines state that certain proposed efficiencies "such
as those relating to procurement, management, or capital cost are less
likely to be merger-specific or may not be cognizable for other
purposes. '53 In the ADM-Clinton case we vigorously contested the
rejection of such efficiencies, as proposed by the motion in limine. It is
a fact of life that some managements are better at reducing costs than
others. To ignore efficiencies that result from superior management is
to close one's eyes on an important component of reality. On capital
cost savings, the Department of Justice wanted us to review each
individual capital investment project and show how it contributed to the
reduction of costs. Since there were hundreds of such proposals,
considering each separately would have been a huge waste of the court's
valuable time. It was enough, we argued, to show that ADM made
capital investments far in excess of those planned by Clinton's previous
owners and that those investments in the aggregate expanded output
relative to earlier plans and led to substantial efficiency gains.
The ADM case was unusual, because the merger had already
occurred and one could look backward and see that substantial cost
savings had actually been realized and examine how they were
achieved. For most mergers, the analysis is prospective, not
retrospective. And although economic historians sometimes joke that
prediction is difficult, especially with respect to the past, we all know
51 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 4.
52 See Wdlianson, supra note 44, at 18.
53 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 4.
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that predicting the future is much more difficult. There are at least three
ways of dealing with the prediction problem.
First, if efficiency evaluations must be made before the merger is
consummated, an extraordinary level of competence must be brought to
bear to analyze the predictions, especially on the side of those who
would dispute management's claims. There was a time when the
antitrust agencies would have been incapable of marshalling such
expertise. Thanks to the budgetary flexibility they enjoy through the
merger filing fees required by amendments to the Hart-Scott-Rodino
pre-merger notification act,54 they can often retain expert talent as able
as that of the merger-making respondents. To do the job right, however,
they will have to seek new kinds of expertise-e.g., the kind possessed
by high-priced management consulting firms. Wassily Leontief
remarked in an economic theory lecture at Harvard in 1960 that an
industrial organization economist is a person who has never been inside
a factory. Even though the statement may have been an exaggeration
then, it is less so now as young economists focus more and more on
theory and less on the real world. If efficiency defenses are to be taken
seriously, new talent will be needed. I might note that there is a kind of
Heisenberg paradox here. If the antitrust agencies were to strengthen
their merger prevention efforts greatly, there would probably be a
reduction in the overall volume of merger activity, ceteris paribus, and
hence a decrease in Hart-Scott-Rodino fees. That in turn would lessen
the ability of the agencies to scrutinize efficiency claims expertly.
Second, for cases in which the would-be merger partners present a
strong efficiencies defense, it might be desirable to allow the merger to
go forward provisionally for a certain period, e.g., three years, after
which a careful review would be conducted to determine whether the
promised efficiencies were in fact achieved. To be sure, there are
instances in which this would not work. If plants are to be closed or
product lines scrambled, it might be difficult to undo the merger if the
promised efficiencies fail to materialize. But when such major
structural reorganizations occur, it is probable (not certain) that they will
be accompanied by appreciable cost savings, and so the merged
company should have less to fear from such post-hoc evaluations.
Finally, there will be many cases in which the evidence of both
efficiency effects and anti-competitive effects is uncertain and
inconclusive. In such cases, one needs presumptions as to the side on
which the risks of error are less severe. At Harvard's John F. Kennedy
m Department of Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-317, 108 Stat. 1724, 1739 (1994) (codified as a note to 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1994)) (amended
Pub. L. 106-553, § I(a)(2), 114 Stat. 2762 (2000)).
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School of Government, we called such presumptions "tie-breaking"
rules. Recognizing that many and perhaps most mergers fail to enhance
efficiency, the proper tie-breaking rule would be to resolve the burden
of doubt on the side of stopping questionable mergers. This appears to
have been what the Court of Appeals did in preliminarily enjoining a
proposed merger between the Heinz and Beech-Nut baby foods
operations.55 Finding that "the district court never explained why Heinz
could not achieve the kind of efficiencies urged without merger,"56 it
ruled that the "public equities weigh in favor of injunctive relief.' 57 As I
read the case facts, the court was appropriately skeptical.
51 See FTC v. H. J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
56 Id at 722.
57 Id. at 727.
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